South African Mediation in Zimbabwe

October 15, 2007.

SOUTH AFRICAN MEDIATION IN ZIMBABWE

From "quiet diplomacy" to concrete action, South African mediation in the southern African country of Zimbabwe has come of age. It is a long short from "shuttle diplomacy" when Henry Kissinger was the United States Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977. Although this term became widespread following Kissinger's participation in shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East and in the People's Republic of China, it can be recalled that he was a mediator between Ian Smith's Rhodesia and the UK. On September 19 1976, Ian Smith was summoned to meet John Vorster and Henry Kissinger in Pretoria. In an uncomfortable encounter, the Rhodesian Prime Minister was told by the South African premier and the US Secretary of State that his dream of delaying black majority rule in Zimbabwe for ‘a thousand years' was over.

South Africa has always played a big role in solving problems in her northern neighbour. South African Prime Minister John Vorster played a significant role when the warring parties met in a railroad dining car atop the Victoria Falls Bridge on 25th-26th August, 1975. Again, on April 29 1977, South Africa reportedly threatened to cut off Rhodesia's oil supply if a constitutional settlement was not reached. Smith resisted the inevitable with a mix of ineffectual concessions and heightened repression, but the power that South Africa held over imports and exports was decisive. Simultaneously, guerrilla war intensified and Smith could no longer count on Pretoria's military backing.

When British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher called for talks while attending a Commonwealth conference in 1979 in Lusaka, Zambia, Smith and his conservative black allies were forced by South Africa to London to the Lancaster House negotiating table, where Zimbabwe was born in 1980.

Thirty-one years after that fateful meeting in Pretoria, there appears an analogous moment of truth. Again, millions of Zimbabweans suffer the depredations of an undemocratic, exploitative ruling elite. Again, a repressive state serves the class interests of a few tens of thousands of well-connected bureaucrats, military and paramilitary leaders and what are disparagingly termed ‘briefcase businessmen,' in the context of unprecedented economic crisis.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the opposition consisted of a formidable political front of two parties - which, although banned and beset by infighting, were strong enough to prevent a "Yes" vote for Britain's Pearce Commission in 1972 and the sell-out deal that Smith was forced to offer in 1978. The social base of the Patriotic Front was a nationalist unification of peasants, the urban poor and workers and the black petit-bourgeoisie. During the late 1990s, a formidable opposition party - the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) - was built upon the urban poor and workers, a portion of the professional black petit-bourgeoisie and wealthy whites: liberals, farmers and business managers/owners.

Since 2000, South African president, Thabo Mbeki has used what he calls "quiet diplomacy" to deal with the explosive politico-economic situation in Zimbabwe. He had been trying to bring to the negotiating table the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) and the MDC in vain. The fly in the ointment, inevitably, was President Robert Mugabe with his disregard for good governance and the rule of law.

President Thabo Mbeki told the British television show Hard Talk in mid-2001 that he had tried persuading Mugabe to reform, but that the Zimbabwean ruler "didn't listen to me". However, by November South Africa signalled an end to its stance of "quiet diplomacy" towards Zimbabwe and was turning up the heat in the face of increasing rights infringements and economic collapse in that country. Mbeki publicly attributed Zimbabwe's problems to "twenty years of economic policies".

In a speech, Mbeki stressed the need for free and fair elections in the combined presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for March 2008. He said that the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) needed to intervene urgently and stressed that Zimbabwe's "misguided economic programme" in the past two decades was responsible for the contemporary crisis.

"In a situation in which people get disenfranchised, in which people get beaten up so that they don't act according to their political convictions, there can't be free elections," President Thabo Mbeki said. It was seen in South Africa as his most forthright criticism yet of the ZANU (PF) government. Conceding that international attempts to rein in President Robert Mugabe's illegal seizure of white-owned commercial farms had largely failed, President Mbeki said: "The situation is not improving at all. If you had elections in Zimbabwe which were not seen by the people as legitimate, then you'd end up with a situation worse than it is now."

For his change of tack from "quiet diplomacy", Mbeki earned an attack from Harare. The state-owned Herald newspaper said in an editorial that "President Mbeki's alleged utterances neatly dovetail into Britain's grand plan for a global coalition against Zimbabwe." He had become part of a "plot to overthrow the ruling ZANU (PF) government from power ... such betrayal is difficult to stomach."

The declining value of the South African rand (the rand has lost over 25% of its value against the US dollar), the loss of investor confidence in southern Africa and the steady stream of Zimbabweans seeking refuge in South Africa have added to the pressure on Thabo Mbeki. Furthermore, part of the South African president's change of heart is explained by his growing realisation that political stability is vital for the success of the New African Partnership for Development (NEPAD) - the African Marshall Plan he has co-authored with other leaders - notably the Senegalese and Nigerian presidents - and which he hopes will help toward continental regeneration.

After having been mandated in March 2007 by the SADC to mediate between ZANU (PF) and the opposition MDC, President Thabo Mbeki set up a team lead by Local Government Minister Sydney Mufumadi, legal adviser Mojanku Gumbi and presidential adviser Frank Chikane to negotiate a settlement in Zimbabwe. The objective is that talks between the political groupings will enable Zimbabwe to address a political and economic crisis that has led to repeated human rights abuses, as well as soaring inflation reported to be over 7,000% on a year-to-year basis and unemployment at 85%, accompanied by shortages of every basic survival commodity.

While it is too early to celebrate, the new tone in the mediation process has taken a positive sound. The mediation process has lead to a unanimous passage of the Zimbabwe Constitution (Amendment No. 18) Bill with both ZANU (PF) and MDC members of parliament voting to approve the amended Bill. Positive elements in the 18th Amendment include:

Presidential, parliamentary and local government elections have been harmonised;
Presidential term has been cut down from six years to five;
Future elections are to be run by only one body instead of the previous bodies, namely the Delimitation Commission, the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC), the Election Directorate, the Registrar-General's Office and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission;
The President no longer appoints 20 MPs in the House of Assembly and
The delimitation variance factor has been decreased from 25% to 20%.

What that august vote means is that the dissolution of Parliament in which ZANU (PF) has a two-thirds majority can only benefit the opposition. There is now an early opportunity to close ranks and at least eliminate that majority. Not just that, but because of the economic hardships, there is even a possibility to win both the presidential and parliamentary elections - that is killing two birds with one stone.

The problems encountered and the techniques employed in promoting an evolution of a democratic system of government recognise the need for compromise. In democratic processes, the position of minority parties in Parliament, their influence in the process of decision making and their effect upon political stability and democracy are paramount. There is always a necessity to sacrifice one's opinion in order to accommodate those of others in order to resolve a crisis. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to compromise in modern politics in Zimbabwe is the absence of a leader with the determination to make it happen.

It is significant to realise that the people of Zimbabwe are dealing with issues of corruption scandals and human rights violations that are translated into atrocities committed against innocent civilians. ZANU (PF) is inept, corrupt, but worst of all full of incorrigible charlatans. Those in government and the civil servants running State administration share collective responsibility. There are cases still hanging in the looting of the Demobilisation Fund in 1982; the VIP Housing Scheme of 1995; the Harare International Airport Scam (1995); the abuse of District Development Fund (1995-1998); the War Victims' Compensation Fund (1997); DRC Diamonds scandal (2002); Gold-buying Licences Scam (2003); the foreign currency externalisation that caught the small fish in 2004; the Safari Hunting Licences Scam (2004); the allocation of stands under Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle Housing Initiative (2005-2006); the diverting of foreign currency paid as carbon tax by foreign motorists entering Zimbabwe (2005); the Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (Zupco) bribery scandal (2005); the land-reform programme, the policy of which was hijacked by turning "one-man-one farm" into "one-minister-five farms" during 200-2007. This is just the tip of the iceberg as far as what is on record.

Categories of atrocities that the ZANU (PF) government has committed since Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 include the Gukurahundi Operation of 1982 - 1987 where more than 20,000 civilians were massacred in Matabeleland and the Midlands; violent land seizures between 2000 and 2005, during which period white commercial farmers and their workers were randomly murdered; the murder and disappearance of opposition and civic society activists that started during the 2000 election campaign and have continued up to date.

Then came the 2005 Operation Murambatsvina, that rendered homeless up to 700,000 of Zimbabwe's citizens and affected, in one way or another, a further 2.4 million when authorities demolished so-called "illegal" homes and structures housing the informal sector. There was Operation Sunrise in 2006, which saw the slashing of three zeros from the domestic currency and rural peasants being treated as criminals by militias and security agents manning road blocks. More than 3,200 Zimbabweans were arrested at roadblocks and their hard-earned cash worth Z$700 billion confiscated. The July 2007 Operation Dzikisa Mitengo (Reduce Prices) resulted in empty shelves and at least 7,600 shop managers and business executives arrested.

There is ‘a moment of madness' written all over Zimbabwe's 27-year history. These violations of human rights and atrocities have left Mugabe and his coterie vulnerable and liable to prosecution on allegations of crimes against humanity. The vulnerability has been made even more real by the experiences of the former and late Serbian president Slobodan Milosevich, former Liberian leader Charles Taylor and the former Zambian president Frederick Chiluba - the latter two who are facing various prosecutions related to alleged abuses while in office.

On the other hand, there is more compelling evidence of the distress signals raised by the security agents, who fear a violent ouster of the 83-year-old dictator. Calls for democratic resistance are being made with growing frequency. With an increasing number of unemployed, low moral within the military, police force, intelligence organisation and public service rank and file, sympathy of the business sector with the plight of the workforce and increasing militancy of student organisations and the country's trade unions, the situation is ripe for a change in the status quo. Repression, restrictive legislation like AIPPA and POSA and the deployment of security forces to quell street demonstrations are no longer a viable and sustainable approach. It appears there is not much the security agencies can do to dampen the appetite for democracy of the opposition and civil society.

Therefore, it is not unreasonable that the MDC has taken a risk in Parliament to enter into a compromise. The MDC should now drive a hard bargain by insisting on a level political playing field sooner rather than later because a free and fair election is part of a process, which starts well ahead of the election right up to the day of the actual polling. A free and fair election would also mean reversing legislation that restricts freedom of speech, assembly and the gerrymandering characterising the delimitation process and the conduct of the voter registration exercise. The right to vote of Zimbabweans living in the Diaspora must be addressed. The depoliticisation of the security forces, including access to the public media, should also be non-negotiable.

To enhance democratic processes and free elections, it is necessary to repeal the Public Order and Security Act (Posa), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (Aippa), the Citizens Act, the Electoral Act, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act, the Broadcasting Services Act, the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, Interception of Communications Act and the Political Parties Finance Act. Confrontation as a strategy to dislodge ZANU (PF) from power simply has not worked, largely because of repressive legislation. Thus, abolition of these laws would enhance the credibility of elections.

The SA mediation team must be pressed to force ZANU (PF) to stop the abuse of food aid by traditional leaders and its supporters as a way of swaying the vote in its favour. Zimbabweans are still being beaten and killed by President Mugabe's militias - the Green Bombers - and other state agents despite negotiations between his government and opposition parties. Political analysts say Mugabe has increasingly resorted to repressive tactics, deploying armed soldiers and the police in the streets to crush dissension.

The ruling party must be made to realise that politics is commonly called the "art of compromise." This label is thought to be especially appropriate for democratic politics. Elected officials representing different voters meet in legislative chambers to hammer out policies that all constituents can live with. Of course, no politicians or voters receive everything they want in the final legislative package: the need to assemble at least a simple majority to implement any policy almost invariably means that supporters of some policy must sacrifice something of value to others active in the political process.

Politicians unwilling to compromise are typically labelled ideologues - a label not regarded as a badge of honour among members of the political class. Moreover, politicians who refuse to compromise seldom win and hold on to office for the obvious reason that uncompromising politicians garner too little pork to send home to voters.

Suffering Zimbabweans now have a real opportunity through an early parliamentary election in March 2008 (which was due in 2010) to put pork (food) on their tables and start the reconstruction of the battered economy.

As Zimbabweans prepare for the combined elections in 2008, there are several features that stand out. They have a nationalist liberation movement which won resounding electoral victories against a terribly weak opposition, but under circumstances of worsening abstentions by, and depoliticisation of the masses, that nationalist movement's undeniable failure to deliver a better life for most of the country's low-income people, while material inequality soared, is glaring.

Secondly, there is rising popular alienation from and cynicism about, nationalist politicians, as the gulf between rulers and the ruled widens inexorably and numerous cases of corruption and maladministration are brought to public attention.

Thirdly, there is growing economic misery as neo-liberal policies are tried and fail. In 1998 the government launched the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (Zimprest) as a replacement for the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Esap). The government argued that Esap was not home-grown and therefore failed to address the country's problems. In 2000 it came up with the Millennium Recovery Programme (Merp), which was drafted by the Planning Commission. It never saw the light of day and was soon replaced by the National Economic Revival Programme (Nerp) in 2003. In November 2004, the government came up with yet another new economic blueprint dubbed "Towards Sustained Economic Growth - Macro-Economic Framework 2004-2006".

The 2006 National Economic Development Priority Programme (Nedpp) was one of the most hyped economic blueprints. The architects said Zimbabwe had to forget the sad memories of a cocktail of other failed blueprints that preceded the Nedpp because the government had finally crafted a plan to reverse, within nine months, the severe effects of ten years of recession.

At the end of September 2007, the government again indefinitely postponed the launch of the Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (Zeds) - an ambitious economic blueprint seen extricating the comatose southern African economy out of an eight-year-old quagmire. Zimbabwe's economic downfall has been around policy implementation as opposed to policy formulation. Zimbabweans could not see that silver lining in the dark cloud that only the government could see!!

Fourthly and finally, there is the sudden rise of an opposition movement based in the trade unions, quickly backed by most of civil society, the liberal petit-bourgeoisie and the independent media - potentially leading to the election of a new, post-nationalist government.

It is obvious this reality crept up on Pretoria to press hard on ZANU (PF) and the MDC to resolve Zimbabwe's conflict once and for all. The other key incident that apparently facilitated the move was the overreach by war veterans in April 2001, when they extended the occupation not simply of white Zimbabweans' commercial farms, but of white South Africans' BIPPA-protected lands (Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements) and factories. It looks this is the straw that broke the camel's back.

It is hoped that ZANU (PF) would not repeat its treachery by stealing the forthcoming combined elections, leaving virtually the entire South African governing establishment flummoxed. If this happens, then there is no good reason for Africa to help Zimbabwe cut its nose to spite its face. It will take a lot of callousness on the part of AU heads of government to defend Mugabe as they have been doing all along.